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NOTES & COMMENTS
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF § 10(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-THE IMPLICATIONS OF
BERSCH V. DREXEL FIRESTONE, INC. AND liT V. VENCAP,
LTD.
Section I10(b) ' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5, 2 promulgated thereunder, proscribe use of the mails or instrumentalities of commerce in furtherance of any scheme to defraud
involving the purchase or sale of a security. The purpose of the Act
is to protect domestic securities markets and American investors
from fraudulent securities transactions.3 The extent of protection afforded by § 10(b) to extraterritorial transactions has continuously
created difficulties among the courts.
Although a presumption exists that regulatory acts of Congress
apply only within the territorial limits of the United States, 4 the
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). This rule provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce,
or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on
rehearing,405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
4 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). The Court
held that the Sherman Act did not apply when all of the acts committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy to restrain trade occurred outside of the territorial limits of the
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traditional view is that Congress has the power to impose liability for
the extraterritorial conduct of persons subject only to the due process
limitations of the fifth amendment.5 In implementing congressional
intent to exercise this power, the courts have been reluctant to impose
liability to the greatest possible extent. They have, however, imposed
liability when the extraterritorial acts of the defendant were intended
to produce a detrimental effect within the United States and when6
such an effect was the actual result of the prohibited activities.
While no language in the Exchange Act expressly indicates an intent
to apply the Act extraterritorially,7 the courts have so applied § 10(b)
United States and were not considered violations of law by the country in which they
were committed.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972).
6 Cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). In Strassheim Mr. Justice Holmes
stated:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing
the cause of the harm as if he [the actor] had been present at the
effect ....

Id. at 285. For applications of this principle on an international level, see Travis v.
Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partiallyrev'd on rehearing,405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
884 (1967); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Whether the Exchange Act is to apply extraterritorially is a question of subject
matter jurisdiction. However, the only reference in the act to subject matter jurisdiction is § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
This is the only sentence in § 27 which deals with subject matter jurisdiction. See
Leasco Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
Therefore, the extent of the Exchange Act's international applicability remains unclear.
The only express limitation on the extraterritorial application of the Act is contained in § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970), which provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he
transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id. While the SEC has not promulgated any rules under this section, § 30(b) has been
literally construed, exempting only those who conduct a business in securities; namely,
brokers, dealers and banks. See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422 (2d
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of the Act." The extent of this application has been clarified by two
recent Second Circuit decisions.
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,' plaintiff, a United States
citizen and resident, brought a class action on behalf of all American
and foreign purchasers of stock of a Canadian financial organization,
Investors Overseas, Ltd. (I.O.S.). The complaint alleged that the
prospectuses distributed in furtherance of an I.O.S. stock offering
were false and misleading in that they omitted certain material facts
relevant to I.O.S.'s financial position.'" The offering involved three
separate distributions" which were intended solely for the benefit of
foreigners. Nevertheless, significant acts in preparation of the allegedly fraudulent prospectuses had taken place within the United
States." Moreover, sales were made to Americans despite defendant's
attempt to limit sales to foreigners. Therefore, collapse of the I.O.S.
offering adversely affected American securities markets.'3 The district court found that the significant acts in preparation of the prosCir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
207-8 (2d Cir.), partially reu'd on rehearing,405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
See text accompanying notes 38-66 infra.
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1975) (No.
75-596), reu'g 389 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
10389 F. Supp. 446, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The substance of the complaint was
"that the prospectuses pursuant to which the offering was made were false and misleading in that they failed to reveal material facts concerning I.O.S.'s finances, illegal
activities, chaotic bookkeeping and mismanagement, and the actual looting and plundering of I.O.S.'s treasury ....
Id.
1 Id. at 451. The three part distribution of common stock by I.O.S. involved a
primary offering of 5,600,000 shares underwritten by six of the defendants, collectively
referred to as the Drexel group; a secondary offering underwritten by J. H. Crang &
Company; and another secondary offering underwritten by Investors Overseas Bank,
Ltd. (I.O.B.), a subsidiary of I.O.S. The accounting firm of Arthur Anderson & Co.,
along with I.O.S. and Bernard Cornfeld, were also named as defendants. Id. at 449.
This action arose from the I.O.B. secondary offering. Id.
12Among the activities within the United States which the district court found
were: numerous meetings in New York of the major underwriters in the Drexel Group,
their attorneys and accountants and I.O.S. representatives; retention of a New York
law firm to represent the underwriters; meetings of the Drexel Group with the SEC;
retention by the underwriters of accountants in New York; and parts of the prospectus
which were drafted and displayed in New York. 519 F.2d at 985 n.24.
' 389 F. Supp. at 458. The district court accepted as evidence of an adverse effect
on American securities markets the testimony by affidavit of an economist. This testimony was essentially that the I.O.S. collapse had impaired foreign investor confidence
in Ameriran markets resulting in decreased sales of domestic securities abroad, and
that this collapse of a mutual fund holding substantial amounts of American securities
caused a general depression in American security prices. Id.
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pectuses which occurred in the United States were an essential element in the fraudulent scheme. Consequently, the court asserted
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of both the foreign and
American members of the plaintiff class. 4
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that the
significant acts in preparation of the prospectuses were not actual
fraudulent activities and were therefore insufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs resident
abroad. 5 However, the acts were sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims of American plaintiffs resident abroad
because the harm done to these class members would not have occurred but for the activities of the defendants in the United States.
Consequently, while significant acts in preparation of the fraud which
occurred within this country conferred subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims of Americans resident abroad, the same acts were
insufficient as to the claims of foreigners so resident. 7
Moreover, the Second Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims of the American plaintiffs residing in the United
States who had relied on misleading prospectuses mailed into this
country by defendants acting abroad." The court, however, stressed
that such fraudulent acts committed abroad would not be a basis for
subject matter jurisdiction when there is no injury to a purchaser or
seller of securities in whom the United States has an interest. 9
"

Id.

519 F.2d at 987. The case was brought before the Court of Appeals pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) on review of the district court order finding subject matter
jurisdiction as to the claims of the entire plaintiff class. Id. at 993-95.
'5

IS

Id. at 992-93.

The Second Circuit discussed the problems which would result if the foreigners
resident abroad were permitted to remain in the class. The choice of law problems
would likely have led to the use of the law of several foreign countries. Further, the
burden of enforcing the judgments, some of which would not be held binding in foreign
countries, along with the problem of managing such a large and diverse class, would
have to be taken into account. Moreover, due to the quantity of the harm involved,
the court found that it would be an abuse of discretion to treat those predominantly
state law claims as pendent. After discussing these problems, the court dismissed the
claims of the members of the class who were not American citizens or residents. Id. at
993-98.
Id. at 991-92.
" Id. at 989. The courts have continuously required that there be a showing of
harm to an American interest before extending liability to persons who, acting abroad,
have caused harm within this country. Since Congress intended § 10(b) to apply to
protect American securities markets and American investors from fraudulent transactions in securities, these markets and investors are presumably the protected American
interests. Compare Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 527-28 (8th cir. 1973)
'
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In a companion case, IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,20 an action was brought
under § 10(b) by IT, a foreign investment trust, and its receivers in
liquidation, alleging fraud, conversion and corporate waste. 2' Defendants were Vencap, a Bahamian venture capital enterprise, and Robert Pistell and Walter Blackman, American citizens resident in the
Bahamas. Pistell organized Vencap after inducing IIT to invest
$3,000,000 in Vencap's preferred stock. The common stockholders,
principally Pistell and Blackman, controlled the issuance of Vencap
dividends while supplying only a nominal portion of the initial investment.3 Although Vencap represented itself as alegitimate venture
capital concern, Pistell caused a substantial amount of Vencap's capital to be used for his personal benefit." In furtherance of its activities, Vencap maintained offices in New York City to house its records
24
and to initiate, direct, and consummate its business transactions.
Although the Second Circuit noted insufficient findings of fact for
a determination of the subject matter jurisdiction issue, it examined
two theories upon which subject matter jurisdiction would exist. The
first possibility analyzed was a derivative suit by IIT as a shareholder
of Vencap charging that Vencap had been fraudulently induced to
purchase securities for Pistell's personal benefit. Since a substantial
part of Vencap's corporate activities was carried on from its base in
New York, the acts constituting fraud under this theory could be
considered as having been performed within this country." The second theory involved a claim that Vencap, although representing itself
as a legitimate venture capital enterprise, was from its inception a
device for enhancing Pistell's private benefit. Under this approach,
Vencap's activities in New York might be seen as essential parts of
the fraudulent scheme. 2 Thus, if upon remand the district court were
to find that the American activities involved in the scheme support
and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-8 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on
rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), with Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972). However,
further extension of the concept of protected American interest never seems to have
been considered. But see text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
20 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
21 Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1003-8.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1018.
2 Id. at 1013-18.
26 Id. at 1013. The court discussed three other possible theories upon which claims
could be based. Id. at 1011-18. However, under these theories, the court held that there
were insufficient activities within the United States to support subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1018.
2

2
24
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one of these theories, subject matter jurisdiction would exist over the
IIT claim.
When applying an act of Congress to transactions with transnational aspects, such as those in Bersch and IIT, a court must ascertain
whether Congress intended the regulatory scheme to apply transnationally.27 In making this determination, the courts have relied on
principles of foreign relations law to infer the extent of the particular
statute's application as intended by Congress. These principles establish the limitations imposed by international law on the application of domestic law to extraterritorial activities." Thus, while Congress has the power to impose liability beyond the limitations of
Foreign relations law,29 the courts will not impute such application
absent express congressional intent.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 31 the Second Circuit recognized that Congress has the power to attach liability to
persons for their conduct outside of the United States. However, the
court stated that the crucial issue in cases attaching liability was not
power, but the limitations Congress intended to place on the liability
once attached.3 1 the Alcoa court held that the Sherman Act applied
extraterritorially where conduct outside the United States was intended to produce, and did in fact produce, detrimental effects within
this country.32 This combination of intent plus detrimental effects is
" The question of whether an act is to apply extraterritorially is deemed one of
congressional intent. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
21 See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 443-7 (Supp. 1935); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 95-9 (1969); Note, The
TransnationalReach of Rule 1Ob-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1368-70 (1973).
2' See text accompanying note 5 supra.
30 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
3, With respect to the limitations imposed by the courts in interpreting acts of
Congress, the court stated:
[Tihe only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to
do so: as a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own
law. Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general
words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers;
limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the "Conflict
of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States.
Id. at 443.
32 Id.
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known as the "objective territorial principle." Under this principle
courts will not extend the application of a regulatory stautute to every
transaction which has substantial foreign aspects. They will, however, impose liability under this principle when intent and detrimental effects are present.
The first case to consider the extraterritorial application of the
securities acts was Kook v. Crang.34 In this case, a suit was instituted
under § 7(c) of the Exchange Act by an American stockholder who
had purchased securities through a Canadian stockbroker on the Toronto Stock Exchange.3 The Kook court held that the Exchange Act
did not apply to transnational transactions in securities unless a
"necessary and substantial" act in the fraudulent scheme occurred
within the United States. 6 Under this test, the courts examined the

" See generally, Mizrack, Recent Developments in the ExtraterritorialApplication of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367,
372 (1975); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
69 CoI.M. L. REV. 94, 95-9 (1969). The objective territorial principle is stated in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965),
which provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if either.
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is
substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent
with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems.
Id. The courts have relied on § 18 in a number of cases. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes
Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 528 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco7Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972).
31182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
1 Id. at 338-89. Plaintiff argued that Crang, the broker, had violated the provisions of § 7(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970), by extending credit to
him at excessive margins. Id.
316
Id. at 390-91. Since all the essentials of the transaction occurred in Canada, the
court found no necessary and substantial act in the United States and therefore held
that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. Id.
The court did find contacts between the defendant and this country which would
have been sufficient to fulfill the § 10(b) requirements. However, the court concluded
that Congress did not intend the Exchange Act to apply without the jurisdiction of the
United States. Id. This was based on the court's restrictive reading of § 30(b) to exempt
all foreign transactions in securities. Section 30(b) has subsequently been interpreted
more strictly. See note 7 supra. Nevertheless, Crang would have benefitted from the §
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acts culminating in the fraud in order to determine whether the acts
within this country were essential to the execution of the fraudulent
scheme despite the fact that the elements of the fraudulent transactions had substantially
taken place without the. territorial limits of
37
the United States.
The limitations on extraterritorial application of the Exchange
Act imposed under the Kook "necessary and substantial" act test
were modified with respect to § 10(b) violations in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook.3 8 In Schoenbaum the Second Circuit held § 10(b) applicable to essentially extraterritorial transactions. An American citizen
residing within the United States who was a shareholder of Banff,
Ltd., a Canadian corporation, brought a derivative action against
Banff's directors and named foreign corporations.3 9 The complaint
alleged that defendants had conspired to defraud Banff by inducing
it to sell its treasury shares at the market price while possessing inside
information that enabled the defendants to know that this price did
30(b) exemption as a broker. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d
Cir.), partially rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).
"' In two cases subsequent to Kook, a necessary and substantial act within this
country was found even though the transactions involved were substantially foreign.
In S.E.C. v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963),
jurisdiction was found in a suit by the SEC to enjoin defendant from selling securities
in an allegedly fraudulent scheme in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The court
found that Canadian newspaper advertisements constituting offers for sale of the securities involved had been distributed within this country, and that the money obtained in exchange for the securities was sent to the defendants in Florida by the use
of instrumentalities of commerce. Id. at 990-91. Even though the corporate offeror and
the sales themselves were located in Canada, the court found that these uses of instrumentalities of commerce and the mails within the United States were a necessary part
of the scheme and therefore jurisdiction existed. Id. at 994-95.
In the second case, Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), one
Canadian corporation sold its controlling interest in an American corporation to a
second Canadian corporation at an alleged premium without disclosing the offer to buy
to minority shareholders in the United States, in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 845. The actual sales transaction took place entirely within Canada. Id. at 845.
However, the court found that use of instrumentalities of commerce and the mails was
necessary in order to change directors and officers of the American corporation and in
relaying control. These activities were necessary and substantial elements of the
scheme within the United States and thus subject matter jurisdiction was found. Id.
at 846.
38 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on rehearing,405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
1' Id. at 204. Defendants were Banff, Ltd., and its individual directors; Aquitaine
Company of Canada, Ltd., Banfi's controlling shareholder; and Paribas Corporation,
a New York corporation. The suit was dismissed as to Paribas. Id. at 219.
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not represent the stock's true value." While the transactions occurred
entirely outside the United States, there was sufficient use of the
United States mails and instrumentalities of commerce to satisfy the
§ 10(b) jurisdictional requirements. 4 1Furthermore, Banff shares were
traded on the American Stock Exchange.42 The Second Circuit held
that on these facts § 10(b) had extraterritorial application. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court found that Congress intended the Exchange Act to protect domestic investors who purchase securities on
American markets and to "protect the domestic securities market
from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securi4
ties." 4
To assure this protection of domestic investors and markets, the
court relied on Alcoa to establish the applicability of the objective
territorial principle when violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were
alleged in connection with extraterritorial securities transactions. 5
Applying the objective territorial principle to the facts before it, the
court in Schoenbaum found the detrimental effect to be the decrease
in value of Banff stock still held by American investors"5 and inferred
the intent because this effect was a reasonably foreseeable result of
the acts done in another country."7 Thus, Schoenbaum extended ex"
"
',

405 F.2d at 204.
See note 2 supra.
405 F.2d at 204-6.

41 Id. at 204. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding insufficient allegations of fraudulent activities to support a § 10(b)
violation. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
" 405 F.2d at 206.

15405 F.2d at 208-10. The court stated:
We hold that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction
over violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the transac-

tions which are alleged to violate the Act take place outside the United
States, at least when the transactions involve stock registered and
listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the
interests of American investors.
Id. at 208.
" Id. The court found that:
A fraud upon a corporation which has the effect of depriving it of
fair compensation for the issuance of its stock would necessarily have
the effect of reducing the equity of the corporation's shareholders and
this reduction in equity would be reflected in lower prices bid for the
shares on the domestic stock market.
Id.
47The intent requirement of the objective territorial principle is similar to that
in tort law where a person is presumed to intend the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his acts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); Becker,
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traterritorial application of the Exchange Act to transactions fulfilling both the § 10(b) requirements and the intent and detrimental
effect requirements of the objective territorial principle.4 8
A new dimension was added to the extraterritorial application of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp.
v. Maxwell.49 Leasco, an American corporation, alleged that defendants had conspired to cause it to buy stock of a British corporation
at prices in excess of the stock's value. The sales transactions took
place in England and the stock was neither registered with the SEC
nor traded on an American exchange." Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that essential elements of the fraudulent
scheme-misrepresentations concerning the value of the
stock-occurred within this country. Thus, the district court acquired
subject matter jurisdiction based on what is termed the "subjective
territorial principle."'" The finding of subject matter jurisdiction in
Leasco was based solely on the occurrence within this country of
significant conduct essential to the furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme. 2 Although the Leasco court found that significant conduct
within the United States would be a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction, it did not enunciate a test for determining whether
ExtraterritorialDimensionsof the Securities Exchange Act, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
233, 236-37 (1969).
,1405 F.2d at 210. While the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's
finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it affirmed the lower court's grant of
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the district court's finding that
the complaint had not alleged sufficient facts to show that the corporation had been
defrauded. See note 42 supra. On rehearing, the Second Circuit en banc reversed this
finding, holding that the complaint had stated a triable issue under § 10(b) except as
to the sale to Paribas. 405 F.2d at 218-19.
" 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
50Id. at 1330-33.

Id. at 1334-35. The subjective territorial principle is set out in the RESTATEMENT
17 (1965), which states:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within
its territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the
effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
Id. See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the ExtraterritorialApplication of Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367, 372-84 (1975);
Note, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687 (1973); Comment, The TransnationalReach of
Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1366-68, 1373-78 (1973).
52 The court stated in dicta that it would have had difficulty in finding jurisdiction
on the Leasco facts if none of the fraudulent misrepresentations had been made in the
United States. 468 F.2d at 1334.
(SECOND) OF FOREICN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

EXCHANGE ACT JURISDICTION

1976]

particular activities would constitute such significant conduct. 5 '
Schoenbaum and Leasco thus established two general principles
under which § 10(b) would be applied extraterritorially. The "objective territorial principle" applies when acts occurring without the
United States are intended to produce, and do in fact produce, detrimental effects upon a protected interest within this country. This
principle allows application of § 10(b) even though the substance of
the fraudulent transaction occurs abroad, provided only that the jurisdictional requirements of § 10(b) are fulfilled." On the other hand,
the "subjective territorial principle" applies when significant activity
essential to the furtherance of the fraudulent scheme occurs within
this country. This principle extends the application of § 10(b) to
fraudulent transactions when the actual locus of the harm is outside
the territorial limits of the United States.
Both the objective and the subjective territorial principles were
applied by the Eighth Circuit in Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd.",'
Plaintiffs, American citizens resident in the United States, brought
an action against Molson, a Canadian corporation, alleging that Molson made a tender offer to Canadian holders of Anthes securities, but
did not extend that offer to the American stockholders." While
Anthes stock had never been registered with the SEC or listed on an
American exchange, the transaction through which the American
shareholders originally obtained the Anthes stock had occurred
within the United States.17 Further, several misrepresentations were
made through use of the United States mails and instrumentalities
of commerce. 8 Plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to retain
their shares by these misrepresentations which promised increased
" While the Leasco court found that misrepresentations which were an essential
part of the fraudulent scheme had occurred within this country) it failed to formulate
a test by which future determinations could be made as to which activities would be
essential. The activities within the United States which were found to be an "essential
link" in inducing Leasco to purchase the Pergamon stock were those that "whetted
Leasco's interest." 468 F.2d at 1335. It was therefore not clear how substantial the
nexus of contact with persons in the United States must be before it would be considered essential.
, See note 2 supra.
"

473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). See Note, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 770 (1974).
Id. at 518-20. Plaintiffs were Glen. L. Travis and his family, and the St. Louis

Union Trust Company, trustee of the Travis family trust. Defendants were Anthes
Imperial, Ltd., Molson Industries Limited, and Dominion Securities Limited, the
broker handling the tender offer. Id.
Id.
I'

Id. at 523-26. The court enumerated several instances in which Molson operatives contacted plaintiffs by phone or letter or met with them in person. Id.
"
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compensation at a later time.59
The Eighth Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction. It relied on
Leasco for the conclusion that the misrepresentations made in inducing the Americans to retain their shares constituted significant conduct within this country." Moreover, the court asserted jurisdiction
based on the objective territorial principle because the plaintiffs, a
protected American interest within the United States, sustained
substantial harm." Since the Anthes stock was not traded on an
American exchange, the court's decision extended application of §
10(b) beyond the limits of Schoenbaum, where the harm was done to
2
persons owning securities traded on a domestic exchange.
In Schoenbaum, Leasco, and Travis, the courts based their analysis on the proposition that Congress intended the securities acts to
protect American investors and securities markets. In order to assure
protection of these interests, these cases established that § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 were intended to be applied extraterritorially. These
courts, in finding subject matter jurisdiction, indicated a trend toward a more expansive extraterritorial application. 3 Schoenbaum
59 Id.
" Id. at 526. The court made it clear that it was immaterial who initiated the
communications which eventually led to the misrepresentations when ascertaining
whether these communications represented significant conduct within the United
States.
61 Id.
One commentator has argued that the courts should undertake a further analysis
in applying § 10(b) extraterritorially. This analysis would require not only a showing
of a detrimental effect caused by a foreign activity within this country under the
objective principle, or a significant activity within this country under the subjective
principle, along with the § 10(b) jurisdictional requirements, but should also apply a
balancing test of national interests before extending § 10(b)'s extraterritorial application. Under this test the court would weigh such factors as the nationalities of the
parties, the situs of the activities involved, whether a foreign forum is available and
what the law of the forum would be. Note, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 770, 776-79 (1974).
These additional factors may take into consideration the class problems recognized by
Judge Friendly in Bersch. See note 19 supra.
82 405 F.2d at 206.
Subsequent applications of § 10(b) to transnational transactions indicated that
the intent of Congress was not to bring any fraudulent securities transaction into the
jurisdiction of American courts. The courts would not have jurisdiction when:
(1) the substance of the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred outside
of the United States; (2) the parties are predominantly foreign; (3)
the subject shares are securities in a foreign corporation neither registered nor traded on a national securities exchange; and (4) there is no
showing of any domestic injury.
Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See
MANUS v. BANK OF BERMUDA, LTD., [1971-1972 TRANSFER BINDER] CCH FED. SEC. L.
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established the existence of subject matter jurisdiction when a fraudulent scheme pursued outside this country produced detrimental
harm to purchasers of securities on an American exchange. 64 Travis
expanded application of the objective principle to a case where no
American securities market was involved.5 Similarly, the Leasco
court's failure to enunciate a test for a determination of the elements
of significant activity" supports an inference of a more expansive
application of the objective territorial principle. Therefore, while
these cases established that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, they
did not foreclose the possibility of a more expansive application when
the harm shown within this country is less apparent than in
Schoenbaum and Travis or when the activities within this country
are less substantial than in Leasco.
The Bersch and IIT opinions represented a clarification by the
Second Circuit of the extent to which § 10(b) applies to transnational
transactions. These decisions expanded the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) to cases where the harm within this country was less
apparent than in Schoenbaum and Travis and where the domestic
activities were less substantial than in Leasco. However, the decisions also restricted extraterritorial application by clarifying the requirements necessary for application of the objective and subjective
principles.
The first instance of this dual effect concerned the objective territorial principle. The Second Circuit in Bersch concluded that Congress intended § 10(b) to protect Americans resident in the United
States against fraud in sales of securities abroad only when the fraudulent acts committed abroad "result in injury to purchasers or sellers
of those securities in whom the United States has an interest" and
"not where acts simply have an adverse affect on the American economy or American investors generally." 7 Since the court assumed
reliance by American residents on the allegedly misleading prospectuses mailed into the United States, it reasoned that there was a
direct effect on a protected American interest-those American residents who detrimentally relied on the prospectuses." The allegations
Rep. 93,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [19701971 Transfer BINDER § CCH FED. SEC. L. REP T 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 459
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972); Jones, An Interest Analysis Approach to Extraterritorial
Application of Rule 10b-5, 52 TEx. L. REv. 983, 993-96 (1974).
64 405 F.2d at 206.

15473 F.2d at 518-20.
66 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
'7

519 F.2d at 989.

Id. at 991-92.
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of harm were less apparent than in Schoenbaum5 because the stock
involved in Bersch was not traded on an American exchange." Moreover, the extent of the harm alleged in Bersch was less clear than that
in Travis where the diminution in value of plaintiff's stock and the
decreased dividends were proven. 71 Therefore, the Second Circuit in
Bersch established that in order to obtain subject matter jurisdiction
under the objective territorial principle, a plaintiff within the United
protected American interest
States need only show a direct harm to a 72
caused by defendant's foreign activities.
However, the Second Circuit stressed that specifity was required
in demonstrating a direct harm, and consequently, refused to apply
the objective territorial principle to plaintiffs' allegations of general
harm to American economic interests or security prices. 73 While the
court agreed that the collapse of I.O.S. had an unfortunate domestic
effect, it concluded that such an effect was insufficient as a basis for
subject matter jurisdiction.7 4 The court further clarified the applicability of the objective principle in IT. There the detrimental effect,
although direct upon the IIT fund itself, was indirect upon the fundholders of whom an extremely small percentage were Americans to
whom the stock was not intended to be sold. Consequently, subject
allegations of
matter jurisdiction did not exist over these 7indirect
5
harm under the objective territorial principle.
9 The direct harm in Schoenbaum was the reduction of equity of the Banff shareholders caused by the increased number of shares on the market after the sale of the
Banff treasury stock. 405 F.2d at 208-9. Since the stock was traded on an American
exchange, it was clear that American investors were harmed by the decrease in value
of the shares they had purchased.
70 519 F.2d at 986.
7, 473 F.2d at 528. The Bersch court emphasized that the plaintiffs would have to
prove at trial that they were directly harmed by the activities which took place outside
of the United States-the mailing from abroad of the misleading prospectuses. 519
F.2d at 990-94.
72 519 F.2d at 993. The court cited Travis for the proposition that "the absence of
certain of the elements which led to finding subject matter jurisdiction in those cases
[Leasco and Schoenbaum] does not necessarily preclude a similar conclusion on the
different facts presented here." 519 F.2d at 986.
11 519 F.2d at 987-88.
14 Id. Plaintiffs introduced evidence consisting of an economist's testimony that
the collapse of I.O.S. had a general adverse effect in the U.S. See note 13 supra. The
testimony contained an opinion that confidence in American underwriters had decreased, that foreign investors had reduced their purchases of securities on United
States markets due to this loss of confidence, and that these decreased purchases had
an adverse effect on American securities markets.
11 519 F.2d at 1016-17. The court found that since a maximum of a .5% interest
in the total IT fund was held by Americans, there was not the "substantial" effect
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The synthesis of the Bersch and IIT opinions illuminates the application of the objective territorial principle. Although the elements
of intent and detrimental effect remain intact, the detrimental effect
must now be direct upon a protected American interest." Thus,
generalized forms of harm are no longer acceptable in a determination of the detrimental effect requirement under the objective principle. This approach is consistent with the rationale used to justify
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act.77 American investors
are protected from extraterritorial frauds, but only upon a significant
showing of direct harm to a protected American interest. 78 Therefore,
under the objective territorial principle, protection of American interests within this country is assured regardless of the situs of the fraudulent activities when the harm is direct.
The second exemplification of this expansive and yet restrictive
effect upon extraterritorial application of § 10(b) regards use of the
subjective territorial principle. In Bersch, the Second Circuit asserted
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Americans resident
abroad based on what it considered "significant" activities within the
United States. 79 The court reasoned that while the actitivities in the
within this country denoted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b) (ii) (1965). See Note 3 supra.
78 The court in both Bersch and IT relied on § 18 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. See note 33 supra. In Bersch there
was harm caused to the American plaintiffs which fulfilled the substantial effect and
forseeability requirements of § 18(b)(ii). 519 F.2d 991-92. In IT the court made it clear
that it would not extend jurisdiction if these requirements were not fulfilled. See 519
F.2d at 1017 and note 75 supra.
" This rationale is that Congress intended to apply the Exchange Act "in order
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities." Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on rehearing,405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
78 519 F.2d at 989-91. The Bersch court stated:
This means to us that there is subject matter jurisdiction of
fraudulent acts relating to securities which are committed abroad only
when these result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities
in whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have
an adverse affect on the American economy or American investors
generally. [footnotes omitted].
Id. at 989. When coupled with the court's requirement of a showing of direct harm to
invoke use of the objective principle, id. at 991, this statement seems to indicate that
a protected American interest is a purchaser or seller of securities directly injured while
in the United States as a result of fraudulent activities which occur abroad. See note
19 supra.
1' 519 F.2d at 992.
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United States were merely preparatory, the sales to Americans
abroad in the I.O.B. offering would not have occurred absent significant domestic acts in preparation of the primary offering."
Bersch, therefore, was the first case to uphold subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Americans when the activities in the
United States forming the basis of jurisdiction under the subjective
territorial principle were less than essential elements of the fraudulent scheme. Leasco, in establishing the applicability of the subjective principle, required significant activities essential to the
fraudulent scheme before subject matter jurisdiction would arise.8 '
Both Leasco and Travis involved substantial misrepresentations
made within this country directly to the person asserting injury. 2 The
Bersch court, however, upheld subject matter jurisdiction when the
domestic activities merely involved the preparation of the false statements constituting the misrepresentations, which were eventually
83
distributed from abroad.
Conversely, the activities in Bersch were insufficient to confer
jurisdiction over the claims of foreign plaintiffs. 4 But in IT, under
the two theories upon which the court could find jurisdiction given
the appropriate facts, "significant" activities would have been sufficient for foreigners' claims if these activities constituted the actual
fraudulent acts.85 The IIT holding surpassed Leasco and Travis because it permitted, for the first time, use of the subjective principle
to protect the interests of foreigners resident abroad."
Thus, the IIT and Bersch opinions have expanded the concept of
1o 519 F.2d at 992-93. There would, of course, be no activities within the United
States upon which the subjective principle could be applied had the activities in
preparation of the prospectuses for the primary offering taken place without the United
States.
' 468 F.2d at 1334-35.
82 See Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 523-26 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d Cir. 1972).
,1 519 F.2d at 992-93.
84 Id.
85 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975). The test used in IT
to assert jurisdiction over the claims of foreigners resident abroad is arguably no
different than that applied by the Second Circuit in Leasco. The Leasco test requires
a domestic act which is essential to the furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. 468 F.2d
at 1334-35. The IT test requires an actual fraudulent act. 519 F.2d at 1017-18. Since
any activity which is essential to a fraud is an "inner or constituent character" of that
fraud, it is a part of a fraudulent activity and the tests should be equivalent. See
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 874 (2d ed. 1957).
" Such an application, however, is inconsistent with the basis of the subjective
principle in International Law. See generally Harvard Research in International Law,
JurisdictionWith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 484-87 (Supp. 1935).
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extraterritoriality under the securities acts in two significant ways.
First, subject matter jurisdiction under § 10(b) exists over the claims
of Americans resident abroad when the domestic activities involved
87
are less than essential to the perpetration of the fraudulent scheme.
Second, § 10(b) will be applied under certain circumstances to protect the interests of foreigners when their injuries occur outside the
United States."
The restrictive aspect of these two cases is essentially an application of a different standard of analysis to foreigners than to Americans under the subjective territorial principle. Subject matter jurisdiction over claims of foreigners resident abroad requires actual
fraudulent acts within this country and not a mere series of acts,
however numerous, in preparation of the fraudulent scheme." Therefore, the amount of fraudulent activity on the part of defendants
which occurs in the United States is not the important factor. Rather,
to invoke subject matter jurisdiction under a § 10(b) claim, a foreigner must show that the fraud which caused him harm emanated
from the United States.
Leasco and Schoenbaum, in establishing that Congress intended
§ 10(b) to apply extraterritorially, reasoned that Congress passed the
securities acts to protect American investors and American securities
markets. 0 In IIT the securities were not traded on American markets
and the plaintiffs were predominantly foreigners. The Second Circuit, however, held that Congress intended to protect foreigners from
the effects of frauds exported from this country.9 ' The Bersch approach provides protection for Americans resident abroad by requiring a showing of activities in preparation of the fraud which are less
than essential to the furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.2 This
expansion of jurisdiction may be justified as necessary to protect an
American interest-those Americans harmed by the fraudulent
" See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1975) (No. 75-596); text accompanying note 81 supra.
" See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975); text accompanying.note 86 supra.
9 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1975) (No. 75-596); IITv. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
90 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-36 (2d
Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on
rehearing,405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See text accompanying notes 44, 52-53 supra.
" 519 F.2d at 1017-18.
92 519 F.2d at 992-93.
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scheme. Concurrently, the IIT court has expanded the concept of a
protected American interest beyond that of Schoenbaum and Leasco
in that the protected interest in IIT was not an American investor or
securities market, but a foreigner harmed by a fraud exported from
this country. Although this expansive application of the subjective
territorial principle is arguably not justified as necessary to protect
an American investor or securities market, it does inhibit the manufacture and exportation of fraudulent schemes from this country.9 3
Thus, the implications of Bersch and lIT are that Americans will
be protected while in the United States through application of the
objective territorial principle when there is activity intending to produce and producing harmful effects within this country which are
direct and not miniscule. Further, Americans are protected while
resident in foreign countries if there is an amount of activity here in
connection with the fraudulent scheme which is significant in preparation or furtherance of the actual fraud. Finally, foreigners are protected while resident in their own countries, but only if they are
harmed by a fraudulent activity in the United States which is an
2
actual part of the fraud.
TED

D. GROSSER

519 F.2d at 1017.
The holdings as to subject matter jurisdiction in Bersch and lIT are also applicable to the extension of personal jurisdiction. Leasco held that Congress intended § 27
of the Exchange Act to extend personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
due process clause. 468 F.2d at 1339. Thus, personal jurisdiction can be had whenever
the defendants satisfy the requirements of "minimum contacts." See Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
When applying the Exchange Act extraterritorially by use of the subjective territorial principle, there will necessarily be minimum contacts with the United States as
a basis for both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The conduct within the
United States which is deemed significant to allow a finding of subject matter jurisdiction would satisfy the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction. Similarly, when
subject matter jurisdiction is based on use of the objective territorial principle, personal jurisdiction can be found on the same theory. The Leasco court set the minimum
requirements of extending jurisdiction over the person as those set out in § 18 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965). 468
F.2d at 1341. Thus, it appears that the same conduct which will allow for an extension
of subject matter jurisdiction will permit a finding of personal jurisdiction.
'3

